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Abstract
This paper examines what shapes taxpayers’ attitudes towards tax compliance – otherwise known as tax morale – in
Pakistan, a country that has struggled with low tax effort over the past decade. We exploit novel survey data
collected in 2014 during a survey of individual taxpayers for the Federal Board of Revenue of Pakistan, which
allows us to offer the first study of determinants of tax morale in Pakistan. These determinants are estimated using a
binary probit regression model. Our results are, generally, in line with the findings of the modern empirical literature
of tax morale in other countries. Overall, groups with lower labor force participation rates have more positive
attitudes towards tax compliance in Pakistan. Educated respondents have higher tax morale in comparison to the
illiterate but only those with very low or very high attainment levels have higher tax morale with respect to
bachelor’s degree holders. In addition, metropolitan areas which are the largest population centers, are industrialized
and seats of government have significantly high tax morale. We show that females have significantly higher tax
morale than males. However, their attitudes towards tax compliance drastically worsen with the passage of time to
the extent that elderly males have higher tax morale than elderly females. Relevant from the perspective of the tax
administration in Pakistan, these findings imply potentially substantial gains from increasing female labor force
participation rates. More generally, addressing the current failures of tax administration and dealing with the
horizontal inequity resulting from administrative weaknesses is likely to contribute materially to improving
voluntary compliance.
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1.

Introduction

Pakistan with its 200 million population has exhibited an ongoing struggle with low tax
collection. With tax collections at 11 percent of GDP in 2015, Pakistan has a low tax effort for its
current level of development (IMF, 2016) and its needs in public infrastructure and basic
services. Moreover, its tax collection effort, as a percent of GDP, has seen a downward trend for
most of the last two decades. At present it is 1.4 percentage points below its peak level of
collection at 12.6 percent of GDP in 1996 (IMF, 2016). Low revenue collections have been
reflected in the large federal government deficit which has fluctuated around 6 per cent of GDP
over the past decade. Large expenditures needs in the shape of public expenditures on major
improvements in service delivery and public infrastructure remain on the planning horizon as the
country aims to pursue its developmental agenda. Improving tax collection therefore has
remained a key item on the policy agenda of different Pakistani governments but despite its
immanence not much has being accomplished so far.
Other than a slightly higher than average reliance on “taxes on international trade” and an
extensive list of excisable commodities, Pakistan’s tax structure is not very different from the
international norm nor at great variance with comparable Asian countries. The low tax to GDP
ratio largely arises out of the low tax effort exerted by the Pakistani tax authority (MartinezVazquez and Cyan, 2015), characterized by putative corruption and administrative weaknesses.1
At the same time, the tax base has not grown significantly over time, indicating low levels of
voluntary compliance. What shapes tax morale in Pakistan, the main theme of this paper, and
what prevents people from voluntarily complying with their tax obligations, thus, comes up as
an important question with wide ranging implications for tax policy and administration refom in
Pakistan.
1

More conceptually, Pakistan’s low tax effort may be explained by the presence of corruption its tax adminsitration
system and the low voice and accountability of its political system (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2008).

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan
At the outset, it should be pertinent to mention that Pakistan faces a number of structural
challenges to its tax and revenue collection systems. To some extent, these are the cumulative
results of repeated past failures at reform that have taken place since 2004. Potentially, these
features of the tax system could also be affecting tax morale. We briefly recount these to place
our discussion of tax morale in the current institutional perspective. First, the bases of the most
important taxes, namely, corporate and personal income tax, and general sales tax (GST) remain
narrow. However, a broader income tax net in developing economies would not necessarily yield
larger tax revenues and cannot be reliably used for re-distributive purposes due to corruption
(Bird and Zolt, 2005). Second, high levels of tax evasion, estimated at 7 per cent of GDP, are
also significant contributors to the tax revenue shortfalls (Kemal, 2003) while also creating
severe horizontal inequities between compliant taxpayers and tax evaders, which undermines tax
morale. Third, Pakistan continues to experience difficulties recovering the revenue losses
incurred with customs reform as indicated by the low buoyancy rate (below unity overall) of the
tax system. Revenue variability of the most important tax instruments is also low which reduces
the ability of the tax system to operate as a built-in stabilizer over the business cycle. Income
taxes and the GST (value-added tax) are relatively elastic (1.2 and 1.9, respectively) but the
excise and international trade taxes are extremely inelastic (Martinez-Vazquez and Cyan, 2015).
Fourth, Pakistan has a large underground economy, which Kemal (2003) estimates around 35-40
per cent of GDP; this, in turn, translates into a small number of registered taxpayers. To make
things worse, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the country’s primary tax collection agency,
has been incapable of collecting from the “hard to tax” and, largely, relies on “easier” tax
handles instead (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider, 2004). Gangl, Kirchler, Lorenz, and
Torgler (2015) examine non-filing dynamics in Pakistan by comparing rich, self-employed
individuals who do not file tax to tax-filers with similar socio-economic characteristics. They
find that less knowledge of taxpayers’ rights and a perception of widespread corruption in the tax
administration are significant predictors of tax non-filing behavior. Sixth, efforts in improving
tax revenues by the federal government have not been complemented by those made by the
provincial governments. The latter prefer larger revenue sharing and transfers from the federal
government than directly taxing their own constituencies, further contributing to revenue
shortfalls and negative attitudes towards taxation. Seventh, tax administration in Pakistan has
been performing below par. High levels of corruption have weakened the effectiveness of field
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audits and lowered yields of witholding on wages and salaries.2 Despite their proven
ineffectiveness in bringing tax evaders into the tax net and their demoralizing effect to tax
compliers, tax amnesties continue to be popular with policy-makers in Pakistan. Favorable tax
treatment of special interest groups continue to cause substantial distortions in Pakistan’s
economy and create windows of opportunity for corruption and tax evasion. Extensive
withholding schemes are a dominant feature of the tax structure in Pakistan but often apply as
final, as opposed to adjustable, and thus, work in a discriminatory fashion. Lastly, as Alm and
Khan (2015) find, businesses are subject to significant differences in marginal effective rates of
taxation (METR), which has led to the misallocation of resources and the slowing down of
Pakistan’s rate of economic growth.
An extensive literature has developed analyzing how differences in tax morale -defined
as the intrinsic willingness to comply with tax obligations- across countries can explain
differences in tax compliance (Torgler, 2007). However, analysis of this element of the
compliance puzzle in the case of Pakistan has been absent to this day due to the lack of data.
Country-specific tax morale analysis has not been possible until now because standard datasets
the empirical literature relies on such as the World Values Survey (WVS) do not contain
information on Pakistan. The only information source available until now, the AsiaBarometer,
only asks survey participants in Pakistan whether they “would like to see more or less
government spending if it requires a tax increase,” but this highlights perceptions about public
goods rather than tax compliance.
In this paper we exploit a novel survey of tax attitudes in Pakistan based on a nationallyrepresentative sample of 2,562 individuals. The nature of the survey data safeguards our
estimates from endogeneity bias stemming from correlation of perception errors in the data
generating process. Our empirical approach replicates standard country-specific studies of the
determinants of tax morale, i.e., it estimates how demographic, socio-economic, and behavioral
factors affect tax morale in Pakistan.
By bridging the informational gap for Pakistan, this paper makes a threefold contribution.
First, we present the first recent estimates of what determines tax morale in Pakistan, adding an
essential piece to the empirical literature. Second, with respect to the previous literature our
2

This is of course a general problem in many countries. For example, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan
(2014) provide evidence from the World Enterprise Survey and the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey that corrupt tax administration exacerbates underreporting at the firm level.

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan
estimates are not subject to endogeneity bias from perception errors’ correlation. By blocking a
potential avenue of endogeneity, we are able to contribute a critical comparison with earlier
findings on comparable countries to Pakistan that may be subject to endogeneity bias. Third, our
rich dataset permits deep, within-group heterogeneity analysis of non-pecuniary factors of tax
morale that is also unique to the previous empirical literature on tax morale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature on the determinants of tax morale. Section 3 discusses the data and the
methodology that has emerged as the canonical methodology in the empirical literature. Section
4 presents the baseline results and, further, explores heterogeneous effects of important
predictors of tax morale across sub-groups of the respondent population. Section 5 concludes.

2.

Literature on the Determinants of Tax Morale

Theoretical foundations
The theoretical literature on the determinants of tax morale posits that individuals’ attitudes
towards tax compliance are determined by pecuniary and non-pecuniary behavioral factors. The
seminal paper on tax compliance comes from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who applied the
Becker’s (1968) expected utility model of crime to tax-evasion. This work highlighted the
importance of pecuniary factors for compliance such as penalties and the audit probability
taxpayers face. However, the high variability in attitudes towards taxation internationally reveals
that other important behavioral factors are actually at play.3

Empirical Evidence
There is extensive evidence from country-specific survey data that directly ask individuals about
attitudes towards tax evasion. Torgler (2011) and Luttmer and Singhal (2014) provide excellent
3

Some studies have predicted tax compliance given enforcement and, then, deduced the existence of tax morale
from the higher than expected observed levels of tax compliance. Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) calibrated
the Allingham and Sandmo model using US data to find much lower predicted rates of tax compliance in
comparison to the actually observed ones. This type of evidence has been interpreted as raising the hypotehsis that
attitudes towards tax compliance are influenced by other non-pecuniary factors that are not captured in conentional
Allingham and Sandmo model. The instance of tax morale has also been documented in settings of minimal tax
enforcement but high tax compliance. For example, Dwenger, Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014) find compliance to
the German church tax even if the latter is not enforced. Under a common enforcement environment, variation in
compliance can be linked to differences in tax morale. In addition, DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) find that US
firms owned by individuals coming from more corrupt countries are less compliant.
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reviews of this literature. Here we first highlight some of the most recent findings pertaining to
the role of institutions on tax morale, especially in developing countries.
Torgler (2005) finds for Latin America an important association betweeen tax morale and trust in
the government, the rule of law, and a pro democratic attitude. He also reports a significant
negative correlation between tax morale and the size of the shadow economy measured as the
percent of informal employment in the total population. In the same fashion, respondents who
knew others or have heard of practicing tax avoidance are also negatively associated with tax
morale. In addition, corruption and an unfair tax system are important reasons for tax evasion
because individuals who perceive the exchange between paid tax and public goods is equitable
comply more. Frey (1997) suggests that large financial penalties may be due to the government’s
distrust to taxpayers which makes compliant behavior less appealing that, in turn, worsens tax
morale. More recently, Daude and Melguizo (2010) confirm that satisfaction with the
government and with public services is an important contributor to tax compliant attitude in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) underscore the
importance of trust in the state and quality of governance for high tax morale in Russia. In the
context of Africa, Levi and Sacks (2009) find that government effectiveness and procedural
justice are key contributors to high tax morale. The OECD (2013) finds that satisfaction with
public services and expenditures and trust in government can positively influence tax morale.
Leonardo and Martinez-Vazquez (2015) show that trust in administrative government institutions
positively influences tax morale. Their analysis focuses on government functions that deliver
public goods and services to taxpayers otherwise known as output organizations of the
government. Litina and Palivos (2016) use two waves of the World Values Survey and the
General Social Survey to find a negative and significant relationship between individual attitudes
of tax evasion and the perceived level of political corruption in 45 countries, but the list does not
include Pakistan.
In addition, there is considerable evidence that demographic and socio-economic characteristics
also affect tax morale. A stylized fact is that seniority in age leads to less tax evasion and higher
tax morale [Torgler (2004), OECD (2013) for Asia; Hug and Sporri (2011) for Eastern Europe;
Torgler (2005), Gaviria (2007), Daude and Melguizo (2010) for Latin America]. Daude and
Melguizo (2010) for Latin America and Torgler (2004) for India also highlight religiosity as an
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important identifier of positive attitudes towards tax compliance. The effect of gender on tax
morale is still an open-ended question as no consensus exists in the empirical findings (Levi and
Sacks, 2009; D'Arcy, 2011 for Africa; Torgler, 2005; Daude and Melguizo, 2010 for Latin
America). Other robust determinants of tax morale in the empirical literature include selfperceived economic situation, education and employment status. Tax evasion is less justifiable to
tax compliers (Levi and Sacks, 2009 for Africa; Gaviria, 2007; Daude and Melguizo, 2010 for
Latin America). Similarly, retirees exhibit higher tax morale relative to those in the labor market,
with the self-employed being suspect of having low tax morale (Torgler, 2004 for Asia; Hug and
Sporri, 2011 for Eastern Europe).
There is also evidence that social norms affect tax morale. Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2007)
explore the evolution of tax morale in modern Spain with a return to democracy and
incorporation into the European Union. Similarly, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006)
emphasize the relevance of social norms in tax compliance in Russia. Their results indicate that
perceived tax evasion has a strong, negative, and statistically significant impact on tax morale. In
a sample of Central and Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries, Frey and Torgler
(2007) focus on behavioral motivations of tax compliance. Their key independent variable,
perceived tax evasion, reflects the degree of horizontal tax reciprocity in a society. Similarly,
they find that taxpayers who believe that tax evasion is widespread exhibit lower tax morale. In
the same fashion, the OECD (2013) reports that perceptions of corruption negatively influence
tax morale. Halla (2012) and Kountouris and Remoundou (2013) exploit ancestry information
from immigrants in the US and Europe, respectively, to show how culture can affect tax morale.
Methodologically, the norm is observational cross-country studies. A number of analyses engage
in global comparisons based on the WVS whereas others conduct regional comparisons that rely
on subsets of the WVS. Other typically employed regional tax morale survey datasets include the
Afrobarometer (by Michigan State University, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, and
the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana), the AsiaBarometer (by the University of
Niigata Prefecture), and the Latinobarometro (by the Latinobarometro Corporation). Firm-level
analyses are primarily based on, first, the World Bank’s World Enterprise Survey and, second,
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. One potential shortcoming of
using such interconnected datasets is the introduction of endogeneity. When different data

8
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providers take into consideration each other’s evaluations, their perceptions can become
endogenous since their “errors” could be correlated.
In rare instances, novel datasets that are generated by face-to-face interviews of individuals in
local languages have been employed; the advantage of these datasets is that they are not subject
to endogeneity from perception errors correlation (Levi and Sacks, 2009). It is in this latter strain
of the empirical literature using surveys where the current paper fits. In this vein we exploit
novel survey data of Pakistani individuals’ (filers and non-filers) attitudes towards tax
compliance. This information is not subject to endogeneity bias from perception errors’
correlation because it was drawn from different regions and localities of Pakistan. Moreover, as
survey responses were collected simultaneously within each locality, it is unlikely that
respondents influenced each other, thus, contaminating the sample.

3.

Data

This paper uses survey data collected during a baseline perception survey of individual taxpayers
for the FBR conducted in 2014. The data were generated in the process of promoting FBR’s
efforts to broaden the tax base and increase tax revenues in a program sponsored by the United
Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International Development (DFID). The program was
implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with the goal of promoting behavioral solutions
to low tax compliance, such as a tax-filing awareness raising campaign. To inform the campaign,
a needs assessment of FBR’s external communications was required. Accordingly, ASI
contracted Semiotics Consultants to undertake a baseline perception survey to elicit opinions of
eligible taxpayers across Pakistan about tax return filing. The purpose of the perception survey
was to understand existing tax return filing dynamics. The survey information was collected
simultaneously from all metropolitan areas in Pakistan starting August 8, 2014 for a period of 67 days. At least 200 tax eligible individuals were selected at random in each area. As a result of
visits to multiple localities within a metropolitan area, individuals from a mix of economic
sectors were targeted (e.g., salaried and non-salaried individuals deriving incomes from other
sources). After discarding any observations with missing values, we obtain a representative
sample of 2,562 individuals across 13 metro areas of Pakistan.

4.

Empirical Analysis

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan
For our empirical analysis of the determinants of tax morale in Pakistan we use survey responses
to the statement “Cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” which are originally coded in
a scale from 1 to 5. As is customary in the empirical tax morale literature, we collapse the five
tax morale ordinal responses to an indicator outcome variable. The 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒! outcome
variable takes the value of one if respondent 𝑖 strongly agreed, or agreed to the previous
statement and zero if respondent 𝑖 neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed
to the previous statement. Essentially, we are modeling the probability of respondents having
positive attitudes towards tax compliance, or in other words, the instance of high tax morale.
More specifically, we are interested in the effect of a change in the values of a set of explanatory
variables 𝑋, including socio-economic characteristics, social norms, and other behavioral factors
on tax morale.
As is standard in the empirical tax morale literature, we estimate the probit regression model
described in equation (1) below.4
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑿! + 𝛽! 𝑰! + 𝜀! (1)
where 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒! denotes respondent’s 𝑖 attitude toward tax compliance. In the vector 𝑿! we
incorporate all demographic (gender, age), socio-economic (employment status, education level),
and behavioral controls. Specifically, demographic information includes dummy variables for
gender and age; the latter measured as a continuous variable from 19 to 80. We also examine the
effect of virtually all levels of educational attainment on tax morale. We introduce indicators for
respondents with no formal education, primary education, middle-school, high-school, and
Master’s level education to compare their association with tax morale relative to college
graduates. Next, we assess the impact of employment status on tax morale using indicators for
the self-employed, those earning rental income, the unemployed, students, and pensioners. The
omitted employment status is respondents who are earning wages. In addition, we test for the
importance of a number of behavioral factors such as perception about corruption in the use of
tax revenues, fiscal policy, social norms surrounding tax filing and its enforcement and the
4

The probit regression estimates the conditional probability of an outcome 𝑌 to be true for observation i; i.e., 𝑌! = 1
in a way that the resulting coefficients are not directly interpretable. To illustrate the impact of changes in 𝑋 on
outcome 𝑌 we compute marginal effects; i.e., the ceteris paribus impact of a change in the regressor 𝑋 on outcome
𝑌 at the mean values of the remaining regressors 𝑋 !! .
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fairness of the tax code. Finally, with the vector 𝑰! we introduce metro area dummy variables in
reference to Islamabad/Rawalpindi (the metro area where the capital of Pakistan is situated).
Summary statistics are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. We specify robust standard errors
for the error term 𝜀! .5

4.

Results

Table 1 below presents the main results of the estimation. We complement them with a graphical
representation of each column in Figures B.1-B.5 in the Appendix.
Table 1: Marginal Effects of Demographic and Socio-economic Factors of Tax Morale

Female
Age
Non-Salaried Rental Income
Pensioner
Unemployed
Student
Self-Employed
Illiterate
Primary Education
Middle School Education
High School Education
5

(1)
Baseline Model
0.0723***
(0.0199)
0.000728
(0.00104)
0.0634**
(0.0282)
0.113**
(0.052)
0.0223
(0.123)
0.0238
(0.0984)
-0.0426
(0.0669)
-0.173
(0.145)
0.0841
(0.0719)
0.0152
(0.0504)
-0.0465*

We present the main results using robust standard errors. As a robustness check, we cluster standard errors at the
provincial level. That is, we examine whether individual responses are independent across but not within provinces.
Even though we use metropolitan area dummies, we hold that the errors should be clustered by province because
local tax policy, if any, is implemented at the provincial level. However, it is clear from Martinez-Vazquez and
Cyan (2015) that provinces do not tax their constituencies heavily but rely on federal grants for their public finances.
Therefore, if any intra-province correlation exists it should not be that important in respondents’ attitudes towards
tax compliance. We expect that the latter are predominantly formed in response to federal tax policy. Empirically,
only the significance of few baseline coefficients changes. These are: Female; Non-salaried income from rental,
services; Self-Employed; High-School Education; and Age of Respondent.

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan

Master’s Degree Holders
Vocational Education

(0.0271)
0.0464**
(0.0214)
-0.0715
(0.0554)

Observations
2,526
*
**
***
Notes: p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Metropolitan Area indicators omitted

Table 1 shows estimates of our baseline specification that adjusts for demographic (gender, age)
and socio-economic characteristics (education, employment status) of the respondents. Females
have significantly higher tax morale than males. In agreement with the past literature, age
positively affects attitudes towards tax compliance. In this instance, we recover a statistically
insignificant impact which we explore further below. Still, pensioners do have significantly
higher tax morale relative to non-pensioners. Respondents earning income from rental income
have more positive attitudes towards tax compliance, relative to those earning wages. In
combination with the results on females and older cohorts, it appears that groups with a low
labor force participation rate have more positive attitudes towards tax compliance in Pakistan.
Similarly, one would expect professional groups with high labor force participation rates to
behave in the opposite way. Indeed, self-employed and respondents with vocational training
exhibit lower tax morale, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.
Overall, groups which are net consumers of public goods with small current contributions to the
public fund desire higher tax compliance. The finding is not statistically significant for the case
of student respondents as the positive effect might be mitigated by frustration with the overall
quality of the educational system.6 Finally, we consider the effect of education on tax morale in
Pakistan. On the extensive margin, the level of education appears to increase tax morale in
Pakistan as the illiterate exhibit lower tax morale. However, the result is not statistically
significant—perhaps due to the very small number of illiterate respondents which inevitably
leads to imprecision. On the intensive margin, education appears to have a U-shaped effect on
tax morale. In reference to bachelor’s degree holders, those with very low levels of formal
6

The data do not distinguish between public and private sector educational institutions. Recently, there were public
protests against high fees being charged by private schools which led to government moving in to regulate the fee
structure. The public sector schools on the other hand are notorious poor performers.
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education, high-school graduates, and master’s degree holders are, respectively, associated with
higher, lower, and higher tax morale.
Table 2: Marginal Effects of Behavioral Factors of Tax Morale

Taxes Promote Progress
Good Use of Tax
Taxes Used for Public Benefit
Investments are Unaffected by Taxation
Tax Ineffective due to Recurring Govt. Spending
Tax Ineffective due to Waste to Unproductive Projects
Tax Ineffective since Consumed in Corruption
Tax Ineffective since Leadership Unaware of its Best Use
Acquaintances do not File Tax Return
FBR will Take No Action to Not Filing
Non-filing Culture in Society
Filing is Necessary for Development of Pakistan
Filing is a Social Responsibility

(1)
Trust in Govt
0.0183
(0.0266)
-0.166***
(0.0493)
0.0521
(0.0251)
0.109***
(0.0253)
0.0665
(0.0466)
-0.0003
(0.0449)
0.0728
(0.0453)
0.0594
(0.0473)

(2)
Social Norms

(3)
Tax Structure

-0.0091
(0.0195)
0.0554***
(0.0200)
0.0293
(0.0201)
0.0201
(0.0252)
0.0625***
(0.0247)

Better to Give to Charity than Pay Tax
Richer Pay More Taxes
Tax System is Fair
Demographic Controls
YES
YES
Socio-Economic Controls
YES
YES
Observations
2,526
2,526
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Metropolitan
Area indicators omitted

0.0246
(0.0191)
0.157***
(0.0260)
0.0840***
(0.0281)
YES
YES
2,526

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan
Table (2) builds upon the baseline specification and extents the scope of analysis to behavioral
factors of tax morale driven by respondents’ perceptions. Column 1 introduces controls for
respondents’ perception of the tax administration. Before reading the results, one should note
that respondents may have masked their true responses to avoid potential penalties or further
actions, which may lead to the imprecision of the data (Kaufman et al., 2010). In an example of
this potential masking, those who agree to the statement that tax money is properly used have
significantly lower tax morale. A potential explanation could be that these respondents are
recipients of special treatment from the government and, thus, are not at-odds with any tax
policies. Still, for those who believe that tax money is used for public benefit, we do find the
expected positive influence on tax morale. Similarly, respondents who believe that taxation does
not affect investment are positively and very significantly associated with higher tax morale.
Column 2 considers the effect of social norms and the underlying perception of tax evasion on
tax morale. Respondents who believe that tax filing is a social responsibility exhibit higher tax
morale, as one would predict. Those who hold that other taxpayers do not file tax returns because
the FBR will take no action (effectively, a very low audit probability) have significantly higher
tax morale. This is somewhat surprising but indicative of an underlying culture that has
experienced that tax evasion is not penalized and consequently had developed a cavalier attitude
toward filing. The preponderance of withholding taxes in Pakistan’s tax system could be another
reason for this attitude. In most cases, despite paying withholding taxes on such transactions as
use of utilities, bank withdrawals and purchase of air tickets, filing returns remains low. Their
calculus might still be that they are able to keep higher levels of incomes for consumption at the
end of all withholding taxes. For example, those who believe that individuals do not file their tax
returns because others they know also do not file- have lower, tax morale although the
coefficient is not statistically significant.
Finally, in column (3) we adjust for respondents’ beliefs about the tax system. Those who agree
that Pakistan has a fair tax system - where taxes are imposed on those who should pay and not on
those who should not pay - are associated with higher tax morale. Similarly, those who agree that
Pakistan has a progressive tax system exhibit significantly more positive attitudes towards tax
compliance.
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Note that in all above probit regressions, we also use metro areas dummies in reference to the
capital, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, which are omitted from the tabular representations. Figure 1
below provides a graphical representation of the coefficients of the twelve metro areas in
reference to Islamabad/Rawalpindi.
Figure 1 – Effects of Metro Area Dummy Variables on Tax Morale:

The graphic depiction shows that most manufacturing cities have higher tax morale with the
exception of Quetta and Sargodha. Quetta from the province of Balochistan appears to have
higher tax morale than Islamabad/Rawalpindi. This could be explained by the fact that Quetta is
the only metro area in Balochistan. In other provinces, metro areas have to compete among each
other to receive provincial public funding into their coffers. Islamabad/Rawalpindi have
significantly higher fractions of population that are government employees paying taxes on their
salaries. Tax morale in the industrial towns is lower than these but still higher than other cities.

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan
As a matter of fact, the only metro area in the Punjab province whose respondents show a more
positive attitude towards taxation relative to Islamabad/Rawalpindi is Lahore, the only urban
center of comparable population and economic activity and, thus, least likely exposed to a
resource drain from the capital. In a province ridden by war and instability (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa), the metro areas of Abbottabad and Peshawar have significantly lower tax morale.
Lastly, we recover a similar relationship between metro areas and tax morale in the province of
Sindh. Respondents from the smaller metro area, Hyderabad, have significantly lower tax
morale, whereas those from the larger metro area and former capital of Pakistan, Karachi, have
more mixed attitudes toward tax compliance relative to respondents in Islamabad/Rawalpindi. A
comparison of metro areas suggests that tax morale is higher in more industrial metro areas. This
could be attributed to the larger share of the population that files their taxes in urban areas, the
higher quality of public services or the fact that there are more residents that are public
employees or benefitting from pension schemes. .
We complete the empirical analysis with a graphical exploration of the interaction of statistically
significant explanatory variables of our baseline analysis. Specifically, we extend equation (1)
with interaction terms that we estimate successively. This allows us to demonstrate the
heterogeneous effects of statistically significant determinants of tax morale in Pakistan across
sub-groups of the population. With regards to demographic and socio-economic characteristics,
we show the effects of gender and age on positive attitudes towards tax compliance in Figure 2.
Figure 2 – Effects of Gender across Years of Age on Tax Morale:
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Interacting age with gender allows us to decompose their effects on tax compliance and provide
insight to our baseline results. We observe young female respondents to exhibit higher tax
morale relative to young males. However, attitudes towards tax compliance deteriorate severely
for females as they age. This could be reflective of elderly women’s low appreciation for the
quality and availability of public services given their great demand for such services. Thus, the
previously found positive but insignificant effect of age on tax morale could be accounted to the
attenuating effect of elderly females. This raises the question whether the stylized fact in the
literature regarding a positive influence of age on tax morale was driven by males or it uniformly
applies to both sexes. This can be an especially important concern if sampling fails to produce an
imbalanced survey with respect to gender. This is the case in this dataset as well, with only 30%
of respondents being female.

5.

Concluding remarks

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan

17

Motivated by the lack of empirical analysis of the determinants of tax morale for Pakistan, we
answer this question drawing from a novel dataset. Our results are, generally, in line with the
findings of the modern empirical literature of tax morale in other countries. Generally, groups
with lower labor force participation rates have more positive attitudes towards tax compliance in
Pakistan. On the other hand, professional groups with higher labor force participation rates such
as the self-employed exhibit lower tax morale but not in statistically significant way. On the
extensive margin, educated respondents have higher tax morale in comparison to the illiterate.
On the intensive margin, education has a U-shaped effect on tax morale; only those with very
low or very high attainment levels have higher tax morale with respect to bachelor’s degree
holders. We find that the metropolitan areas which are the largest population centers, are
industrialized and seats of government have significantly high tax morale. In provinces where
metro areas compete for public funds from the provincial tax administration, respondents exhibit
lower tax morale.
To exploit the information that is rich in behavioral factors of tax compliance, we employ
interaction terms to examine heterogeneous effects of important predictors across subpopulations. We show that females have significantly higher tax morale than males. However,
their attitude towards tax compliance drastically worsens with the passage of time to the extent
that elderly males have higher tax morale than elderly females.
There are several findings that are relevant from the perspective of the tax administration in
Pakistan. The important difference in tax morale across gender implies potentially substantial
gains from the introduction of more females in the labor force. Given their low labor
participation rates and the existence of a large pool of female college graduates, general
compliance could be improved by introducing young labor initiatives specifically targeted to
females. Also, the tax administration should avoid further deterioration of the potentially more
compliant taxpayers’ perception about the administration by reducing instances of corrupt
practices and eliminating the annual practice of tax amnesties. Improving the beliefs of those
who bear the burden of taxation could be achieved by increasing incentives for early-filers and
those who file online or even providing credits for those with a good compliance record. More
generally, addressing the current failures of tax administration and dealing with the horizontal
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inequity resulting from administrative weaknesses is likely to contribute materially to improving
voluntary compliance.

The Determinants of Tax Morale in Pakistan
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APPENDIX
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES
Age
High Tax Morale Indicator
Female Indicator
Employment Status Indicators
Rental Income
Pensioner
Unemployed
Student
Self-Employed
Educational Attainment Indicators
Illiterate
Primary Education
Middle School
High School
Master’s Degree
Vocational Education
Metropolitan Area Indicators
Quetta
Abbottabad
Peshawar
Faisalabad
Gujranwala
Gujrat
Lahore
Multan
Sargodha
Sialkot
Hyderabad
Karachi

Mean
38.824
0.275
0.308

Standard Deviation
9.574
0.445
0.462

Min
19
0
0

Max
80
1
1

0.144
0.034
0.004
0.008
0.020

0.351
0.182
0.066
0.087
0.141

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0.006
0.167
0.033
0.162
0.388
0.029

0.077
0.128
0.179
0.368
0.488
0.168

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

0.075
0.079
0.078
0.072
0.079
0.077
0.077
0.078
0.078
0.079
0.074
0.076

0.263
0.270
0.268
0.259
0.270
0.267
0.267
0.269
0.268
0.269
0.261
0.264

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Notes: N = 2,526 Individual Survey Respondents. Variable “High Tax Morale” equals one if
respondent strongly agreed or agreed that “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and
zero if respondent neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagree to the previous
statement.

